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 In this follow-on to Lewis & Doerr (2021), we present some additions to the 
literature review on the Navy’s long-term challenges with battery acquisition and 
industrial policy, as well as a cost model that could be of value in developing and 
evaluating alternative procurement strategies. Details of the model are provided in 
Appendices A and B. 
Literature review 
 We suggest that an appropriate way of viewing the Navy’s challenge with battery 
development, including the fostering of a renewed domestic production capability, may 
correspond to a network perspective. The use of networks may represent what Mintzberg 
and colleagues (1985; 1994, p. 25) referred to as “emergent strategy,” which occurs 
where a realized strategy was not expressly intended. Instead, individual actions, perhaps 
appearing unrelated to each other, were taken over time and resulted in some kind of 
consistency or pattern.  
Mintzberg et al. (1998, p. 189) also suggested that the presence of an emergent 
strategy demonstrates the organization’s capacity to experiment and therefore learn. In a 
comment on “professional organizations”—which could certainly include DOD—this 
experimentation provides the basis for change within an otherwise rigid structure: 
Major reorientations in strategy—“strategic revolutions”—are discouraged by the 
fragmentation of activity and the power of individual professionals as well as their 
outside associations. But at a narrower level, change is ubiquitous. Individual 
programs are continually being altered, procedures redesigned, and clientele 
shifted. Thus, paradoxically, overall the professional organization is extremely 
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stable yet in its operating practices in a state of perpetual change. Slightly 
overstated, the organization never changes while its operations never stop 
changing. (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 192) 
 Since the 1950s, government agencies have engaged in a series of initiatives that 
have provided learning opportunities for both the public and private members of the 
networks involved with battery production, as well as the technological advancements 
that were the explicit goals of each initiative. The emergent strategy referred to above 
could be through the creation of networks: 
Networks can allow for rapid learning and facilitate the reconfiguration 
of relationships – such as with suppliers (in the case of companies) or 
with producers of knowledge (which may be other companies or research 
institutions). Networks can stimulate the development of additional cooperative 
activities around a diverse range of issues including training, technological 
development, product design, marketing, exporting and distribution. 
(Cunningham & Ramlogan, 2016) 
The rapid learning referred to above has become particularly important as the pace of 
technological innovation and obsolescence has accelerated. This faster pace has 
accelerated the speed at which an organization must adopt it to remain in front as well as 
the competitive response of adversaries’ technologies. Accordingly, the use of networks 
is particularly important when the choice is made, consciously or not, to rely on emergent 
strategy (Hunter & Crotty, 2015; Rao et al., 2020, p. 23). 
Mazzucato (2013) points out that in government agencies, there are also wins and 
losses, and that losses need to be used as lessons learned to improve and renew future 
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policies. Innovation goes beyond invention of new products or technologies to include 
the capability to “‘make good ideas stick’ by ensuring that new ideas are applied to the 
benefit of end-users” (Freeman et al., 2015). Emergent strategy has therefore been 
characterized as a significant factor in government policy-making (Matheson, 2009).  
The transition from invention to innovation has significant economic and national 
security implications. Innovation frequently takes place between diverse actors at the 
global level, making regulatory control by national governments difficult (Rao et al., 
2020, p. 23; Blank, 2019). Finally, except for the large defense contractors, DOD must 
compete with other customers for the attention of innovative firms: 
Keep in mind that private high-tech development typically results from the 
interplay of scientific inquiry and market demand, rather than meeting the known 
requirements of a given customer. Emulating this model, R&D for the armed 
forces, intelligence services and other agencies must transcend existing 
specifications for platforms or products under contract. The right approach is to 
energise military and other government planners to engage in free-form thinking 
about the challenges they expect to face, such as those posed by China. This 
would lead to fresh concept development for refining such challenges and 
devising alternative ways of meeting them. (Gompert, 2020) 
In that vein, researchers have suggested that the U.S. must more aggressively support 
cooperation with allies on technological innovation, both for defense-specific systems 
and in the broader economy (Kliman et al., 2020). To a certain extent, the use of 
networks by DOD parallels similar changes in the private sector.  
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Major defense and technology firms within the U.S. and peer nations have shifted 
from vertically integrated structures to networks of partners (National Academy of 
Sciences, 2007, p. 209; Whitford & Schrank, 2011). This transition is particularly 
important as many technological innovations related to defense come from outside the 
government and its own network of laboratories (National Academy of Sciences, 2007, p. 
482; Brannen et al., 2020). In this context, networks become key for the creation and 
survival of knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship (Malerba, 2002; Malerba & Vonortas, 
2010). As explained by Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, & 
Acquisition) James Geurts, “the power of these Tech Bridges [networks supported by the 
U.S. Government] is they’re not on bases, they’re not behind barbed wire, they’re not just 
only a requirements-pull. It’s a way that we can get idea-push” (Eckstein, 2020). 
Increasingly, diffusion of innovations depends on horizontal systems such as 
networks. These networks may operate in unpredictable manners relative to traditional 
vertical structures, but in ways that can be shaped to meet desired goals (Mazzucato, 
2013, p. 207, Whitford & Schrank, 2011). However, the governance of the network must 
be sufficiently strong to ensure its viability and ongoing existence. Otherwise, the 
network will fail as its member institutions opt out, as described somewhat explicitly by 
Schrank and Whitford (2011): 
Network governance is functional in organizational fields characterized by 
unstable demand, dispersed and rapidly changing knowledge, and complex 
interdependencies between component technologies. But it may nonetheless fail 
in those fields, and it does so when exchange partners either screw each other or 
screw up. They are more likely to screw each other when formal and informal 
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institutions fail to inhibit opportunism; they are more likely to screw up when 
such institutions fail to facilitate the search for new information beyond the 
network. When the institutions in question simultaneously inhibit opportunism 
and facilitate search, network governance becomes viable—at least insofar as 
technological and demand conditions render it desirable. However, when such 
institutions neither mitigate opportunism nor facilitate search, network production 
is all but impossible and stillbirth or devolution—that is, absolute network 
failure—occurs. 
In industries that have a complex, expanding knowledge base, and where 
expertise is widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in the overall network 
rather than in individual firms (Powell et al., 1996). Although the increasing prevalence 
of networks in innovation has reinforced the tendency toward globalization, the same 
trend has also reinforced the importance of the home nation (Freeman, 1995). There is 
also an interplay between national capabilities and the inter-relationships of individual 
technologies: 
A history of flexible and adaptive learning relationships within a network (with 
suppliers, customers, and others) provides member organizations with formidable 
sources of competitive advantage. Alternatively, allowing learning-based linkages 
to atrophy can lead to costly results. For instance, inadequate emphasis on 
manufacturing and a lack of cooperation among semiconductor companies 
contributed to an inability to respond rapidly to the early 1980s Japanese 
challenge. When the challenge became a crisis, cooperative industry initiatives 
moved U.S. companies toward closer interactions with government (such as the 
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Semiconductor Trade Arrangement) and eventually to a network (the Sematech 
consortium) that improved the ability of industry participants to learn in mutually 
beneficial ways, including collaborative standards setting. (Rycroft & Kash, 1999) 
Fuchs (2010) provides the example of DARPA program managers, who act as 
“embedded agents” who act as a central node in social networks. The presence of both 
large and small firms further increases the importance and contribution of a network form 
of organization: 
Power may be constrained in networks owing to complex tasks 
high in human asset specificity. These tasks demand a high degree of 
creative problem solving, knowledge, and effort, which are enhanced by 
a cooperative, rather than adversarial, orientation. Those who are typically 
seen as powerful—the prime contractors, distributors, or financiers— 
become dependent on subcontractors to execute their tasks with their best effort 
and with financial integrity. (Jones et al., 1997) 
Consistent with the above explanation, networks can be viewed as invoking the image of 
connectedness between either individuals or organizations (Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005; 
Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). The relationships fostered by DARPA can lead to the 
formation of networks that provide a favorable context for innovation by participants in 
that network: 
Under conditions of uncertainty, firms seek out partners with technological 
complementarities. Collaboration can shorten the time it takes to bring new ideas 
to market, while access to a broad network of cooperative R & D [research and 
development] provides companies with a rich portfolio of diverse information 
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sources. Moreover, rather than simply enhancing the transfer of information 
between two or more parties, the relationship becomes an opportunity for novel 
syntheses that diverge from the stock of knowledge previously held by the 
individual. In such circumstances, networks can become the locus of innovation. 
(Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005) 
For government employees, participation in innovation networks like DARPA is an 
example of the use of an “island/bridge” model, where innovative groups are relatively 
isolated from bureaucracy, but are allowed direct contact with decision-makers and end 
users (Rao et al., 2020, p. 100).  
DARPA program managers receive a flow of information from the larger research 
community and match this information to military requirements. They also provide a 
system-level perspective to researchers focused on specific technologies that will require 
integration at a higher level in order to successfully function within a weapon system. 
These program managers also actively orchestrate and continually restructure these 
networks in order to encourage new technology development in directions that support 
DOD goals (Fuchs, 2010; Mazzucato, 2013, pp. 80–85; Bonvillian, 2019).  
As explained by Tether and Metcalfe (2003): “Innovation systems are not 
naturally given, they are constructed to solve problems; as they develop, so knowledge 
and institutions co-evolve.” Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest that governance of a 
network like an innovation system “requires frequent reassessment of structural 
mechanisms and procedures in light of new developments, and a willingness to make 
needed changes even if they are disruptive.”  
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The government agencies that lead an innovation network may have specific, 
long-term goals that are the result of policy decisions made by elected or appointed 
officials. These goals should be clearly communicated to current and potential network 
partners, explaining why participation is worthwhile from their perspective (Cunningham 
& Ramlogan, 2016; Freeman et al., 2015, p. 27). Within the U.S. political system, overt 
actions that appear to favor specific firms are discouraged, leading to the emergence of 
what Block (2008) termed a somewhat hidden “developmental network state.”  
While the U.S. has a very large defense and technology sector, explicit 
developmental agendas such as those set by the European Union and its member states 
are uncommon. Statements from government officials that the U.S. government does not 
“do industrial policy” are not consistent with empirical evidence (Hooks, 1990; Fong, 
2000; Weiss, 2014). In that context, any major initiative involving the government must 
maximize funding transparency, and minimize rent-seeking behavior (Gerstel & 
Goodman, 2020). 
Too much visibility of the U.S. government’s role in technology development and 
innovation could conflict with what is seen as a predominant discourse favoring market 
fundamentalism (Whitford & Schrank, 2011). Government support for technological 
innovation is intentionally fragmented among multiple agencies, and the impact of the 
spending is also dispersed among many large and small firms, as well as universities and 
other nonprofit research organizations. In that context, an emphasis on smaller firms is 
appropriate, given that a growing proportion of technological innovation and 
manufacturing output comes from smaller companies (Wade, 2017).  
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The government may be seen as involved in four distinct but overlapping tasks: 
targeted resourcing (such as money and people), opening windows (fostering 
communication among members of a network), brokering, and facilitation (Block, 2008; 
Rao et al., 2020, pp. 136–137). Given the value of approaching innovation in battery 
development and manufacturing from a network perspective, the next section will discuss 
some policy considerations that the Navy may wish to further explore. 
Policy options 
 In Lewis and Doerr (2020), we set out recommendations for consideration by the 
Navy with respect to long-term strengthening of the security of supply for batteries and 
refer the reader to that report. Here, we will provide some information on recent 
initiatives in support of battery acquisition. 
A recent report by the Federal Consortium for Advanced Batteries (2021), a group 
of agencies that includes DOD and the Department of Energy, proposes specific 
measures that should be taken by the U.S. Government with respect to security of supply 
and support to the different participants in the domestic battery supply chain. The FCAB 
lays out a “national blueprint” of specific measures, with a focus on lithium batteries, and 
lays out five goals. The report also describes specific measures to achieve these goals, 
which are: 
1. Secure access to raw and refined materials and discover alternatives for 
critical minerals for commercial and defense applications. 
2. Support the growth of a U.S. materials-processing base able to meet domestic 
battery manufacturing demand. 
3. Stimulate the U.S. electrode, cell, and pack manufacturing sectors. 
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4. Enable U.S. end-of-life reuse and critical materials recycling at scale and a 
full competitive value chain in the United States. 
5. Maintain and advance U.S. battery technology leadership by strongly 
supporting scientific R&D, STEM education, and workforce development. 
The FCAB blueprint also emphasizes the specific nature of military requirements, which 
are evolving with both technological change and emerging concepts such as distributed 
operations: 
Faced with increasing kinetic and non-kinetic threats, the Department is shifting 
toward more distributed, austere, and autonomous operational concepts carried 
out by platforms and installations with escalating power requirements. As such, 
DoD prefers domestically sourced, high-density energy storage to support agile 
forces utilizing power-hungry propulsion, communications, sensors, and weapons. 
However, the DoD supply chain is challenged due to the unique nature of 
batteries for weapons systems, as well as constituting only a small percentage of 
the larger commercial market for advanced batteries. As advanced lithium-ion 
batteries become strategically important, so too do assured sources of critical 
minerals and materials needed to sustain a robust and resilient domestic industrial 
base. 
The blueprint further explains the specific requirements of many batteries used in military 
applications: 
The military uses batteries in systems that operate at extreme cold or hot 
temperatures, encounter high shock and vibration, and that may be stored for long 
periods before being required to be ready for immediate use in a short time. 
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Defense battery systems are at times operated in environments where safety 
demands exceed commercial requirements and are subject to a range of kinetic 
and cyber threats. While lacking a formal estimate, DoD believes demand for 
these batteries will grow, not just from traditional uses such as combat platforms, 
weapons, sensors and individual warfighter equipment, but also from the 
hybridization of the combat platforms and introduction of tactical microgrids.  
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) (2021) 
emphasized that trends in battery technology and use require DOD to support stable 
production orders, meaningful research and development investment, and integrated 
acquisition strategies. These actions would also support long-term workforce 
development and private investment in industrial capacity. The importance of 
establishing a reliable, resilient supply chain for advanced, high-capacity batteries was 
emphasized in Executive Order 14017 of February 24, 2021. This EO lays out 
requirements for a number of agencies, including DOD, to review measures to ensure 
“resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains.” The first three areas of inquiry are 
particularly relevant: 
(A) the manufacturing or other needed capacities of the United States, including 
the ability to modernize to meet future needs; 
(B) gaps in domestic manufacturing capabilities, including nonexistent, extinct, 
threatened, or single-point-of-failure capabilities; 
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(C) supply chains with a single point of failure, single or dual suppliers, or limited 
resilience, especially for subcontractors, as defined by section 44.101 of title 48, 
Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Acquisition Regulation); 
In a similar vein, the U.S. Army asked for the assistance of the National Academies of 
Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) (2021) in determining its future power 
needs. Within the Army’s future operational scenario of multi-domain operations, 
potential power technologies were assessed against forecast requirements.  
One of the findings of the NASEM study team was that all-electric tactical 
vehicles would have limited practicality on the battlefield, given their recharging 
requirements, when considering a time horizon through 2035. However, hybrid vehicles 
were seen as having considerable potential, along with microgrid technologies for 
powering deployed forces. Generally, the Army’s operational concepts were seen as 
leading to a significant increase in energy use, notably for systems that provide 
situational awareness to units, and for equipment used by dismounted soldiers. 
Navy efforts in support of a renewed industrial policy will need to be 
accompanied by internal efforts that ensure that data on battery requirements, usage, and 
procurement patterns is analyzed and monitored in a systematic manner. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has suggested that there are four general strategic sourcing 
tactics in procurement: leveraging scale, standardizing requirements, prequalifying 
suppliers, and understanding cost drivers (GAO, 2013).  
In this vein, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has directed federal 
agencies to strengthen their efforts to engage with industry, such as through the practice 
of “category management,” which emphasizes enterprise-wide approaches to 
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procurement that allow for better use of agency personnel and acquisition funding. The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is promoting category management within 
DoD.1 Part of the motivation for category management is that federal agencies engage in 
little sharing of market and supplier intelligence. and make no effort to collect or analyze 
true spending data at the agency level (Laurent, 2019).  
NAVSEA’s current project to develop a battery database supports the 
development of a category management approach, which has so far had limited adoption 
within the Navy but has been widely adopted in the Air Force (OMB, 2019a; OMB, 
2019b; Pasquini, 2019). A recent research project at the Naval Postgraduate School 
examined the Navy’s spending on studies and analyses, which according to Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 2.101(b) include “studies in support of R&D activities, 
acquisitions of models, methodologies, and related software supporting studies, analyses or 
evaluations.” The organizations requesting such studies include Navy SYSCOMs, with Naval 
Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren identified with the largest expenditure within the Navy 
over the period 2009–2018 (Brill & Surarujiroj, 2019). 
Cost model 
In this section, we develop notation to support the computer-based model we 
implemented in Excel and Crystal Ball that allows users to assess a variety of 
procurement strategies for batteries. In the following section, we report on the use of the 
computer-based model to perform scenario analysis on a set of hypothetical scenarios. 
  
                                                 





The cost structure of a mitigation strategy includes at least 3 elements for each 
investment option: 
Ki = The non-recurring cost of establishing the option i, 
Mi = The average monthly recurring cost of maintaining that option until it is exercised,  
MI = The incremental average monthly recurring costs of that option during a supply 
disruption, and 
Vi = the average per-battery incremental cost of batteries through that option during 
disruption.  
The four options laid out in our previous report were: 
i = 1 = A one-time transfer batteries from another theater, 
i = 2 = Use an alternative (substitute) battery, 
i = 3 = Stockpile batteries, and 
i = 4 = Develop an option to expand production with an alternative supplier. 
In our previous report, we developed a shortfall model, in which the impact of a 
disruption to a battery supply source would be measured with the distribution of unmet 
demand, after the disruption. That model assumed some residual supply might be 
available and assumed one or more of the four alternatives would be used to meet unmet 
demand, beyond that residual supply.  
Here, we incorporate that residual supply as a remediation investment option i = 
0, simply to recognize that the per-battery cost of residual supply might be higher, 
because of the disruption.  
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Each of the costs would have to be estimated for each investment option, for any 
battery that faces substantial risk of supply chain disruption. Costs will vary by battery 
depending (for example) on the nature of the materials used, the anticipated unmet 
demand volume, and the shelf-life of the battery. 
If a mitigation strategy includes one of these options, that option would need to be 
prepared in advance: procedures specified, and any contractual requirements agreed-
upon. Even a one-time transfer of batteries from another theater (option 1) would need to 
be planned and agreed upon in advance, to insure timely delivery to the theater in need. 
The costs of such preparation would be part of non-recurring costs. In our model, we will 
assume such preparation has been done in advance.  
For options 2 and 3, we model some risk of delay between the time of the 
disruption and the beginning of supply, but the delay we model is meant to be an 
operational delay, to begin production or retrofit. It is not meant to include the lengthier 
delays associated with planning (e.g., design and testing of retrofit).  
The options are not mutually exclusive and can be combined. The transfer option, 
in fact, works best as a short-term mitigation to allow other options to come online. 
Battery substitutions (which might involve some retrofit) and production-expansion in 
particular might take a significant amount of time to become operational, and to supply 
unmet demand: these options would need to be supplemented with other short-term 
solutions. For those two options (substitution and production expansion) we model a 
random 1-3 month operational delay, to begin increased production or retrofit.  
A stockpile of batteries should be worked into the normal supply chain, of course 
(to reduce waste and increase turnover of the inventory). So, a stockpile might eliminate 
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the need for an inter-theater transfer, but only if the stockpile was sufficiently large to 
meet all unmet demand each month, and that might be prohibitively expensive in terms of 
waste, and reduced life of the batteries once deployed from the stockpile. 
So, as with any portfolio, developing multiple options might be less expensive 
(and less risky) than developing a single option. We assume that each option can be 
developed to provide only part of unmet demand, and that several supply options might 
be used in a coordinated way to meet unmet demand following a disruption. Each option 
is assumed to have a known (estimated) upper bound Ui, on how many batteries it could 
potentially supply. We introduce decision variables,  
wi = the percentage of Ui, that we plan for option i to provide. 
A set of values for wi (that is, the choices of how many batteries to obtain from 
each option, of the maximum supply available from that option) can be thought of as the 
basis of a mitigation strategy. Once established, an option is assumed to provide supply at 
the level required by wi without uncertainty. However, it is a simple extension to make 
this supply variable, if for example, the production or retrofit process associated with 
options 2 and 3 are expected to have variable yield, or uncertainty in their production 
throughput. 
The cost of a strategy is time dependent, both because there may be recurring 
regardless of whether the disruption occurs, but also because the incremental costs of 
exercising an option are incurred only after a disruption, and only for the duration of the 
disruption. 
For simplicity, since any time frame would be arbitrary, we will examine a 
relatively short time window (2 years) to avoid discounting. Since the cost of mitigating 
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the disruption is of primary interest, we assume the disruption will occur within the two-
year window we examine. Our model assumes the disruption will occur anytime within 
the 2 year time window, and that once it occurs, it will last for the remainder of that 2 
year window. This is equivalent to assuming the disruption lasts between 1 and 24 
months. 
Without discounting, the two-year (24 month) cost of a strategy in which the 
supply disruption lasts for d months would be 
∑ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 + 24𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖>0 + 𝑑𝑑[𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
′]      (1) 
Where only the costs of options adopted (wi > 0) are incorporated. This cost is 
deterministic except for the random duration of the disruption. The expected cost would 
be equal to the expected duration (within the two year window), of course.  
Note that non-recurring, and time-dependent recurring costs are incurred 
regardless of the level of production at which that option is adopted. This means that 
options with relatively expensive non-recurring costs (for example, an option to expand 
production) become relatively more attractive when they are employed at higher 
utilizations. 
Cost and performance risk is captured by the model  
What we call budget risk is captured by estimating the probability a particular budget is 
exceeded (e.g., assuming a normal distribution, a budget set to the expected cost would 
have a 50% budget risk). The only significant variability in cost, as noted above, is the 
random delay in beginning operation, but as these delays can be as long as 12.5% (3 
months) of the time widow, they can create significant budget risk. (We also dollarize the 
random cost of battery obsolescence for the stockpile option, but we limit the maximum 
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size of the stock pile based on the expected shelf-life of the battery, so this cost is small.) 
Let A be the size of a given budget, and F(A) be the cumulative distribution of costs 
expressed in equation (1) at budget level A (i.e., the probability the costs will be less than 
A). We can then express the Budget Risk as the probability  that costs exceed the 
budget: 
1 - F(A) = β          (2) 
Performance risk is here defined in terms of unmet demand (shortfall) after the supply 
disruption. The shortfall is a function of residual supply after the disruption, and wartime-
tempo demand, a random variable. Since the extent of the disruption is uncertain, the 
shortfall is a random variable with two sources of uncertainty (Vroom, et al., 2019). 
Let B be the random variable representing the size of the total shortfall in battery 
supply at the end of the disruption. and let G(B) be the cumulative distribution of that 
shortfall.  Then performance risk can be expressed as the probability  that the shortfall 
is no larger than B.   
1 - G(B) = α          (3) 
If we set B to zero, we are estimating the Performance Risk, α, associated with having no 
shortages at all. 
Equation (2) and (3) can be used to frame a bi-criterion optimization problem, in which 
we seek to simultaneously minimize budget risk and supply risk. A typical approach to 
solving such bi-criterion problems is to constrain one objective, and optimize the other 
(i.e., Goal Programming). In this problem, that would translate to either constraining the 
budget risk to be no more than β, and minimizing the supply risk, or constraining supply 




While our model could be used to provide a general response-surface map of 
budget-risk and supply-risk across a broad range of parameter combinations, the number 
of parameters in the model, and the computation time required to examine each solution, 
makes such an exercise expensive to do with the tools we have available (Excel, and a 
very ordinary laptop). We also think the marginal value of such an exercise would be 
modest. Each battery will have a unique set of feasible options, depending on the 
available substitutes and shelf-life. Cost parameters will depend on the battery 
technology, scale of production, and handling (hazmat) costs for that battery. It is 
unlikely that useful generalizations beyond those given below could be made with 
hypothetical data. 
So, in this section we describe three different sets of nominal alternatives 
(scenarios) and their solutions. Our goal is to demonstrate that any of the options might 
be optimal depending on the underlying cost structure, and to discuss some of the pros-
and-cons of each option via those scenarios. 
Scenarios 
The three scenarios we use to illustrate our model are shown in Appendix A1-A3. 
Each scenario is constructed to favor one of the three main options (substitution, 
production-expansion and stockpile) as described in the Appendices. Non-recurring and 
recurring-monthly cost parameters are notional but set to be approximately equal:  
$100,000 in non-recurring costs, and $10,000 in recurring monthly costs for each option.   
Those options without significant non-recurring or recurring-monthly costs (option 1 = 
transfer and option 0 = spot-market) are not long term solutions, but they have their 
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parameters set so that they can be selected to satisfy demand in the short term (1-3 
months).  
The volume of supply from each of the three main options is set high enough so that a 
single option, in conjunction with the two short-term options, can satisfy demand. This 
means that in our examples, two primary options will never be used in conjunction. But 
we think this is reasonable because, given any significant non-recurring costs associated 
with these options, one never would use two of them together, unless demand could not 
be satisfied (within risk tolerances) in any other way.  
For simplicity, we assume a two year cost horizon. Though, if the non-recurring 
costs are high or if the probability of a supply disruption is low, we would recommend a 
longer time frame for the analysis, to better capture the relative costs of those options that 
have high ‘maintenance’ costs when not exercised (e.g., production-expansion).  
We allow the time of the onset of the disruption to vary, but for simplicity we 
assume that once it starts, the disruption lasts for the rest of the two-year window. In 
other words, we are simulating the two years in which a major disruption starts and 
allowing that major disruption to begin randomly (uniformly) across that two year 
window. An alternative approach would be to capture the yearly cost of an unexercised 
option, and the yearly cost of an exercised option. If the time-to-disruption or the time-of-
disruption is expected to be lengthy, we recommend that alternative approach (these costs 
are easily estimated via the model, by setting the time-of-disruption to occur in month 12 
without variance). 
We assume that the transfer option could only be used to help satisfy unmet 
demand one time, in the first month after the disruption. In our numerical examples, costs 
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parameters are set (low non-recurring costs, and no recurring costs) so that the transfer 
option will always be used. Spot market variable costs (the incremental price of the 
batteries after disruption) are set higher than other options. We think this is a reasonable 
assumption. If the price of non-contracted batteries was low before a disruption, it is 
unlikely to remain so. 
We assume that the production-expansion and substitution options have a random 
delay before they can provide supply, distributed as Triangular (1,2,3), meaning the delay 
will be at least a month, most likely 2 months, and at most 3 months. Demand and pre-
disruption supply numbers are based upon (disguised) data relating to a high-demand 
battery employed by USMC, as drawn from Vroom et al. (2019). 
Optimization Parameters 
The problem of minimizing supply risk (3) subject to an upper bound on budget 
risk (2) is stochastic and nonlinear. We used Monte Carlo Simulation to evaluate the cost 
of each combination of options, and a non-linear search engine to find a preferred 
solution (values of wi). 
The number of trials for each simulation of a potential solution is set to 10,000. 
For each scenario, the run time was limited in duration. As the scenarios are constructed 
to provide a particular solution, this run time serves mostly to confirm that we 
successfully built the desired scenario. A sample of the optimization search output (from 




Figure 1. Output from the optimization search. 
 
We arbitrarily set risk appetite β to 5%, and the budget for a solution to $500,000. Note 
that our two year ‘budget’ mimics a budget for approximately $100,000 of non-recurring 
setup costs, and approximately $200,000 per year to supply batteries on a contingency 
basis. Because on average, the disruption occurs around month 12, and has a duration of 
about 12 months. Actual budgeting for an unexpected disruption or unexpected duration 
is a difficult issue, because expenditures are necessarily higher only during the disruption. 
But that is an issue beyond the scope of this paper.  
Finally we note that, the sum of the decision variable wi weights do not need to 
sum to 1.0, since the since production levels for each option are normalized to the upper 
bound on supply for that option, and not stated as a percentage of total supply. The cost 
vector shown with each solution re-normalizes the weights to show the percentage of 
total cost expended on each option. 
The model we’ve developed is available for what-if analysis or optimization against other 
parameter sets. Appendix B provides instruction. Excel and Crystal Ball are required. 
Discussion 
Below we review a set of observations drawn from the construction of our 
scenarios and their solutions in Appendix A1-A3. 
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Stockpiling (Appendix A1) 
Stockpiling is more sensitive to the length of (unemployed) battery life than the 
other options, of course. And depending on the expected duration of the disruption and 
the level of demand, stockpiling might not be feasible or effective. Indeed, the months-of-
supply (relative to demand) that a stockpile can provide is primarily limited by that 
batteries life-in-storage by the cost of wastage. For the level of demand in our scenarios, 
an expected life of 42 months enabled full demand coverage at a reasonable cost in 
wastage. 
We used a simple model to estimate wastage, with an assumed low variance 
around the average wastage. More complex models of battery-life are available (e.g., 
Maddikunta et al., 2020), and should be incorporated into any design of an actual 
stockpile to reduce wastage costs. 
Safety concerns can also arise with the storage of batteries for long periods. Such 
issues are beyond the scope of the paper, but safety costs should be incorporated into the 
recurring costs of operating the stockpile. Organizations within the Navy Battery 
Development and Safety Enterprise could estimate such costs and establish handling 
procedures (Pasquini, 2019).   
It is worth noting that we had to iterate several times over the parameter sets of 
the scenarios to find a solution that was superior to stockpiling. If the stockpile is 
integrated into the regular supply chain (this must be done, as already explained, because 
batteries are perishable), the stockpile is immediately available. That reduces the risk 
associated with the start-up delay of the other two main options (substitution and 
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production-expansion). The other options address that risk of delay by drawing more 
heavily on the expensive spot market. 
Production-Expansion (Appendix A2) 
In addition to adjusting variable costs, we had to reduce the assumed shelf-life of 
the battery and reduce the delay associated with bringing expanded production capacity 
online in order to make this option optimal instead of stockpiling. In general, production-
expansion will be more attractive when the delay to bring the new capacity online is short 
and the costs associated with exercising the option are low. Otherwise, if stockpiling is 
feasible in terms of shelf-life, it is likely to be less expensive, and will certainly be more 
reliable. 
The primary drawback to this option, though, is the recurring-costs of maintaining 
the option before it is exercised. If that cost is high (or equivalently, if the probability the 
option will be exercised in the near-term is low), the costs of this option may be 
prohibitive. The DoD pays non-recurring costs for the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement, and some other capacity expansion options (e.g., CRAF).  But in general, 
such agreements are a way of reserving capacity that already exists for commercial 
purposes, not bringing new capacity online. They also tend to have other benefits, beyond 
mere capacity expansion.  
Substitution (Appendix A3) 
Compared to the base-case assumptions, we lowered the non-recurring costs of 
the substitution option, reduced the time delay to bring substitute supply online, and 
shortened the shelf life of the battery to make this option optimal. In general, substitution 
will be more attractive than stockpiling when any needed adaptation is quick (reduced 
26 
 
delay), the recurring costs of adapting the new battery are low, and the shelf-life is short 
relative to the expected duration of the disruption (precluding the stockpile option). 
The primary drawback of substitution may be the performance implications. One 
must assume there is some reason why a battery isn’t being used as the primary option. If 
this is merely cost, using substitution on an emergency basis may not be problematic to 
performance. But it may be that the battery needs some physical adaptation to “fit” into 
the application, or that the power signal provided is sub-optimal. Such factors are 
idiosyncratic to each case, but safety and performance concerns must be assessed with 
any planned substitution, in addition to supply and cost concerns examined here. 
Conclusion 
 The Navy stands at a crossroads with respect to battery acquisition strategy. 
Managerial decision-making increasingly needs to reflect the rapid evolution of battery 
technology, manufacturing, and industrial base considerations. Also, critical tradeoffs 
need to be made between cost, performance, and risks to readiness of decisions related to 
battery procurement. Our model suggests a manner of characterizing those tradeoffs in a 
coherent manner that incorporates the time delays associated with specific approaches to 
procurement. An effective portfolio of decisions with short- and long-term implications 
should be a consideration for the Navy’s future approach to acquiring batteries.  
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Appendix A1. Stockpile Strategy 
Table A1-1 shows the parameter set for this scenario. The three primary options 
all have fixed, non-recurring costs equal to $100,000. Recurring costs are approximately 
$10,000 per month for each scenario, though there are differences in how and when these 
recurring costs are incurred (see Appendix B for details of recurring costs, the demand 
and spot-market assumptions used across all scenarios, and an explanation of 
optimization settings). Substitution and Expansion each have 1-3 month delays after 
disruption, before they provide supply. Variable costs for the three primary options are 
set at $1.00 (additional) per battery. 
Table A1-1. Parameter set for Stockpile Scenario.  
 
 
With these settings, the optimal solution is to use the stockpile strategy, and to 









Supply/Mon 9,000        
Expanded
Cap (B/M) 9,000       
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      Stdev 10 Stdev -             Stdev -            
Stdev 250          
Avg Field






Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Stockpile
Size (Batts) 205,000 Min delay 1                 Min delay 1                
Source 2
Avg Inv (Bat) 5,000      
Expected
Delay 2                 
Expected
Delay 2                
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      
Non-Recurring
Stkpile Costs $100,000 Max delay 3                 Max delay 3                




Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Bat Cost
Delta ($/Bat) 1$            
Non-Recurring








Left at Sources 1               
Bat Cost











paid for the stockpile strategy (for any of the primary strategies) they will tend to be used 
to 100% of capacity, unless constrained by budget.  The solution is shown in Table A1-2. 
Table A1-2. Stockpile Strategy costs and risks. 
 
Figure A1-1 below shows the distribution of total costs. The spiked shape is 
caused by discrete variance in the month disruption occurs. The earlier the disruption, the 
more batteries expire before use. This graph shows the primary tradeoff in pursuing a 
stockpile strategy: the length of the disruption, compared to the battery shelf-life. In this 
scenario, the average shelf life (42 months) is long compared to the duration (maximum 
24 months). Even so, if the disruption occurs in month one, the total cost tends to exceed 
the overall budget. 
  
Acceptable
Risk 0.05  Cost of Strategy 413,122$   
Budget 500,000$           Avg Mon Theater Inv 9,774          
Percent-Alternative-Implemented % of Total Cost
















Figure A1-1. Total Cost of the Stockpile Option. 
   
 
The solution supplements the stockpile with 49% of the available spot-market 
capacity (490 batteries per month) to reduce supply risk. The distribution of supply at the 
end of the disruption is shown in Figure A1-2. 





The graph shows the large variance in end-of-disruption supply-chain inventory 
(recall that average demand is 8,000 batteries per month). This is partially an artifact of 
the model: the supply rate is fixed for the duration of the disruption, and not reduced in 
those instances when the month-by-month realizations of random demand happen to be 
low. In reality, if demand was low for several months in a row, supply would be 
temporarily curtailed.  In that sense, Figure A1-2 is better understood as the distribution 
of supply capacity, beyond the random 24-month demand. The average level of field 




Appendix A2. Optional Production-Expansion Strategy 
We modified the parameter set in two ways so that production-expansion would 
be selected by the optimization engine: in the stockpile option we reduced the expected 
shelf-life of the battery to 21 months, and in the other two options we reduced the delay 
between disruption and available supply. The new parameter set is shown in Table A2-1. 
Table A2-1. Parameter Set for Production-Expansion Scenario. 
 
Shortening the shelf-life of the battery reduces the available supply, because it 
reduces the maximum feasible size of the stockpile. It also increases the cost of the 
stockpile option, since more batteries are wasted. The primary drawback of both the other 
two options is the delay between the start of the disruption, and the time they can begin to 
supply batteries. A three-month delay can create a backlog that is impossible to fill 
during the disruption. Shortening this lead time makes both these options more attractive. 









Supply/Mon 9,000        
Expanded
Cap (B/M) 9,000       
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      Stdev 10 Stdev -             Stdev -            
Stdev 250          
Avg Field






Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Stockpile
Size (Batts) 100,000 Min delay -             Min delay -            
Source 2
Avg Inv (Bat) 5,000      
Expected
Delay 1                 
Expected
Delay 1                
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      
Non-Recurring
Stkpile Costs $100,000 Max delay 2                 Max delay 2                




Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Bat Cost
Delta ($/Bat) 1$            
Non-Recurring








Left at Sources 1               
Bat Cost











Table A2-2. Optional Production-Expansion Costs and Risks.
 
Note that this solution involves executing both of the short-term options (spot 
market and inter-theater transfer). This must be done, to cover the 1-2 month delay in 
bringing the production expansion online. Also note that production-expansion is actually 
less costly than the stockpile strategy, on average, and provides almost the same supply-
risk coverage. But this is only possible once the lead time is reduced from our base-case 
scenario.  
When the lead-time can be up to three months, the short term options cannot meet 
demand in the third month, even if employed at 100% of capacity.  This is a tradeoff that 
must be addressed with any production-expansion option: the delay in bringing 
production capacity online, and the availability of short term alternatives for supply.  
Figure A2-1 shows the distribution of total cost for this production-expansion 
solution. Compare this against Figure A1-1 and note the range of costs is wider with 
production-expansion. This is partly due to the variability induced by the random delay, 
Acceptable
Risk 0.05  Cost of Strategy 354,826$   
Budget 500,000$           Avg Mon Theater Inv 11,722       
Percent-Alternative-Implemented % of Total Cost
SpotMkt 0.86  6%
Transferred 1.00 5%
Stockpile 0.00 0%  
Substitution 0.00 0%




Optimization Parameters Simulated Outcomes of this Remediation Strategy
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but also because the variable spot market supply is used more heavily (the price would 
also be random in the spot market, though this is not modeled).  
Figure A2-1. Total Cost of the Production-Expansion Option.
 
The distribution of end-of-disruption inventory is shown in Figure A2-2. Again, note that 
the outcomes are more variable than with the stockpile option. But also note the 
distribution is more skewed, and that, while small backlogs are more probable, large 
backlogs are less probable, compared to the stockpile option. This may also be a 
consequence of a greater reliance on short term spot-market and transfer options to 










We further modified the parameter set so that substitute-supply would be selected 
by the optimization engine: in addition to reducing the expected shelf-life of the battery 
to 21 months, reducing the delay between disruption and available supply, we also 
changed the non-recurring cost of adapting substitute batteries for use. The new 
parameter set is shown in Table A3-1. 
Table A3-1. Parameter Set for the Substitute-Supply Scenario. 
 
In the base case scenarios, the production-expansion option has a cost advantage 
over substitution because, after the option is exercised, the monthly recurring cost is 
$10,000 for substitution, but only $7,500 for production-expansion. We reverse these 
recurring-costs in this scenario, and substitution is favored. Note that in general, for the 
same costs during the disruption, substitution would be preferred, because production-
expansion is going to be more expensive before the disruption. The preference for the 









Supply/Mon 9,000        
Expanded
Cap (B/M) 9,000       
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      Stdev 10 Stdev -             Stdev -            
Stdev 250          
Avg Field






Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Stockpile
Size (Batts) 100,000 Min delay -             Min delay -            
Source 2
Avg Inv (Bat) 5,000      
Expected
Delay 1                 
Expected
Delay 1                
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      
Non-Recurring
Stkpile Costs $100,000 Max delay 2                 Max delay 2                




Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Bat Cost
Delta ($/Bat) 1$            
Non-Recurring








Left at Sources 1               
Bat Cost







Delta ($/Bat) 1.00$       
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year period in which a disruption is guaranteed to occur.  The solution to the substitution 
scenario is shown in Table A3-2. 
 
Table A3-2. Substitution Option Costs and Risks.
 
The essential difference between Table A3-2 and A2-2 is that the savings from 
the $2,500 monthly expense of maintaining a non-exercised option have been invested in 
further spot-market purchases, further reducing supply risk, without increasing budget 
risk. Indeed, the supply risk reduction comes with a slight reduction in average costs. 
Spot market and transfer options are both fully employed, so the optimization engine 
cannot further reduce risk without engaging another (expensive) primary option like 
stockpiling or production-expansion, which would not be cost-feasible. 
Figure A3-1 shows the distribution of total costs for the substitution option. As this 
option further employs variable spot-market supply, it has a slightly wider range of costs. 
  
Acceptable
Risk 0.05  Cost of Strategy 328,692$   
Budget 500,000$           Avg Mon Theater Inv 12,032       
Percent-Alternative-Implemented % of Total Cost
SpotMkt 1.00  8%
Transferred 1.00 5%
Stockpile 0.00 0%  
Substitution 1.00 87%






Figure A3-1. Total Cost of the Substitute Supply Option. 
 
The distribution of end-of-disruption inventory is shown in Figure A3-2. The distribution 
is similar to that shown in Figure A2-2, but has a slightly higher range, because this 
option employs variable spot market supply more heavily to reduce supply risk. 





Appendix B. Model Walkthrough 
In this appendix, we explain the model inputs section-by-section. Each section 
corresponds to a different worksheet in an Excel workbook. The model is run with a 
Monte-Carlo Simulation add-in for Excel called Crystal Ball which is sold by Oracle 
Corporation and is available at many USN and USMC commands. A brief section at the 
end describes how to run the model in Crystal Ball for what-if analysis, or to support 
preliminary contingency planning for any particular battery. But the model could easily 
be adapted to another commercial Monte Carlo Simulation tool (e.g., @Risk). 
Shortfall Module 
Generates random demand pre- and post-disruption. 
Post disruption supply = spot market supply. 
Regular Supply (B/Mon): input estimate of average demand pre-
disruption. Units: Batteries per month. 
Stdev: input estimate of standard deviation of demand, pre-disruption. 
Batteries per month. (Stdevs cannot be zero, use .01 if necessary.) 
Post disruption (spot) Supply: input estimate of average residual 
supply after disruption. Batteries per month.  
Stdev: input estimate of standard deviation of residual supply. 
Batteries per month. 
Peacetime Demand (B/M): input estimate of average pre-disruption 
demand. Batteries per month. 
Stdev: input estimate of standard deviation of pre-disruption demand. 
Batteries per month.  
Wartime Demand: input estimate of post-disruption demand. Batteries 
per month. 
Stdev: input estimate of post-disruption standard deviation of demand. 
Batteries per month. 
Cost/Bat Peacetime: input estimate of average cost per battery, pre-
disruption. 
Inc Cost/Bat Spot Mkt: input estimate of incremental, or additional 
cost per battery post-disruption. Can be negative. 
Regular
Supply (B/Mon) 5,000            
Stdev 1,250            
Post-Disruption
(spot) Supply 1,000            
Stdev 250                
Peacetime
Demand (B/M) 5,000            
Stdev 1,250            
Wartime
Demand 8,000            
Stdev 2,000            
Cost/Bat
Peacetime 10$                
Inc Cost/Bat





Note that the model estimates incremental total costs as a primary output. 
Only the additional cost of supplying spot market batteries is captured. Cost/Bat 
Peacetime is captured for a reference point (current monthly cost) in the shortfall 






Calculates number of batteries that can be transferred (one time) 
from up to 2 (non-threatened) theaters to a threatened theater. 
Source 1 Avg Inv (Bat): input estimate of the average inventory 
position (# of batteries in stock) at this non-threatened theater.  
Average Usage (B/M): input an estimate of the avg demand for 
batteries (per month) needed in this non-threatened theater. 
Stdev: input an estimate of the standard deviation of batteries 
demanded (per month) in this theater. 
Non-Recurring Xfer Cost: input an estimate of the expenditure 
necessary to move the batteries to the threatened theater. 
Source 2 Avg Inv (Bat): as above for a potential second source / 
non-threatened theater. 
Average Usage (B/M): as above. 
Stdev: as above. 
Non-Recurring Xfer Cost: as above. 
 
Min Mon-Sup Left at Sources: input number of months-of-supply 
desired to be left at source theaters after they transfer “excess” 
batteries to the threatened theater. Number of months. 
This is a one-time transfer with a single non-recurring cost. 
 
Note that in the above example, exactly 1,000 batteries would be left at Source 1, 
and 1,000 batteries left at Source 2. The information on Standard deviation is captured for 
an information-only calculation of the service-level / fill-rate that the Source theater will 
face, after they supply their ‘excess’ batteries to the theater under threat. This fill rate 
estimate is displayed for information purposes in the transfer module (worksheet), and is 




Avg Inv (Bat) 5,000      
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      
Stdev 250          
Non-Recurring
Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Source 2
Avg Inv (Bat) 5,000      
Average
Usage (B/M) 1,000      
Stdev 250          
Non-Recurring
Xfer Cost 8,000$    
Min Mon-Sup




Calculates total (2 year) cost of stockpile, size of stockpile, monthly 
supply after disruption. Estimates # of batteries that expire unused. 
Avg Batt Life (Mon.): input est. of the average battery life, in months. 
Stdev: input estimate of standard deviation of (a) batteries life, in 
months. Cannot be negative. See note in module. 
Avg Field Inv (Batts): input estimate of average inventory position 
(number of batteries) in threatened theater (field). 
Stockpile Size: This is currently calculated by the stockpile module. The 
calculation can be over-ridden and a number can be entered. 
Non-Recurring Stockpile Costs: input an estimate of all one-time costs 
associated with establishing the stockpile. Should not include purchase 
cost of batteries. 
Recurring Costs ($/Mon): input an estimate of monthly costs of 
operating the stockpile. Should not include purchase cost of batteries. 
Bat Cost Delta ($/Bat): input an estimate of incremental cost of (a) 
battery. Can be a negative number. 
 
Note that the stockpile size estimate is simply the number of batteries which can 
be held at pre-disruption demand levels so that the average battery will be used before the 
end of the 24 month window. It is calculated via Little’s Law and ignores battery shelf-
life. 
Battery shelf life and standard deviation is used to calculate the number of 
batteries that expire unused. Battery life is assumed to follow a normal distribution, with 
the standard error in the number of expired batteries per shipment calculated from the 
per-battery standard deviation and the size of the shipment. It is assumed these are 
shipped DOA, and their cost is added to the total cost of the option. 
Purchases into a large stockpile may well be obtained at a price discount. If so, a 



















Calculates total cost of a (retrofit) substitute battery. Calculates 
supply based on demand up to capacity.  
Retrofit Supply/Mon: Enter estimate of the planned capacity 
(batteries per month) of the retrofit facility. 
Stdev: enter an estimate of the standard deviation of substitute 
batteries supplied per month. Can be (defaults to) zero. 
Bringing the retrofit facility online is expected to take time. The next 
three parameters are used to estimate this random delay. 
Min delay: in months, enter the estimated minimum delay. Can be 
zero. Need not be integer. 
Expected Delay: Enter the estimated most-likely delay, in months. 
Must be greater than the minimum. Need not be integer. 
Max delay: Enter the estimated maximum delay, in months. Must be 
greater than the most-likely. Need not be integer. 
Non-Recurring Retrofit Cost: enter an estimate of the one-time costs 
required to design and test the retrofit battery/power-supply. 
Exercised Recurring ($/Mon): enter an estimate of the monthly costs 
to retrofit, or supply of substitute batteries. Not purchase cost. 
Bat Cost Delta ($/Bat): enter an estimate of the incremental cost of a 
fully retrofitted battery. Can be a negative number. 
The delay factor here is meant to capture the time required to begin operations of 
a retrofit facility, or establish contracting and supply chain for a substitute battery that 
requires no retrofit. It is not meant to capture the time to design or test the use of a battery 





Supply/Mon 9,000        
Stdev -             
Delay to 
field (mon): 
Min delay 1                 
Expected
Delay 2                 
Max delay 3                 
Non-Recurring
Retrofit Cost 100,000$ 
Exercised 
Recurring ($/Mon) 10,000$    
Bat Cost




Calculates total (2 year) cost of production-expansion. Calculates 
supply based on demand up to capacity. 
Expanded Cap (B/M): input estimate of capacity of expanded 
production facility in batteries per month. 
Stdev: input std. dev. of batteries supplied / month. Can be zero. 
Bringing the facility online after disruption is expected to take time. 
The following parameters are used to estimate the random delay. 
Min delay: enter the estimated minimum delay, in months. Can be 
zero. Need not be integer. 
Expected Delay: enter the most-likely delay, in months. Must be 
greater than the minimum. Need not be integer. 
Max Delay: enter the estimated maximum delay, in months. Must be 
greater than the expected delay. Need not be integer. 
This option has costs even when not being used (retainer fees). 
Non-Exercised Non-Recurring: input estimated one-time costs 
associated with negotiating and establishing the option contract. 
Non-Exercised Recurring ($/Mon): input estimated cost per month to 
retain this capacity option, if any. Not battery purchase costs. 
Exercised Non-Recurring: input estimated (contracted) one-time costs 
to exercise option to increase capacity/supply. 
Exercised Recurring ($/Mon): input estimated (contracted) monthly 
cost of operating expanded facility. Not battery purchase costs. 
Bat Cost Delta ($/Bat): incremental cost of a battery. Can be negative. 
 
Since the disruption occurs randomly and uniformly across the 24 month time horizon of 
the model, on average, the Non-Exercised costs will be paid for one year. Hence, the total 
cost of this option (on average) is the cost of paying the non-exercised costs for one year, 




Cap (B/M) 9,000       
Stdev -            
Delay to 
field (mon): 
Min delay 1                
Expected
Delay 2                










Delta ($/Bat) 1.00$       
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Parameters can be input manually for 
what-if analysis or estimated by the 
Crystal Ball engine. 
Acceptable Risk: maximum risk that 
(random) cost exceeds budget. 
Budget: Cost to establish and run 
facility for two years, including 
disruption in supply. 
SpotMkt: % of max Spot Market 
capacity (batteries / month) purchased. 
Transferred: % of ‘excess’ capacity 
from non-threatened theaters. 
Stockpile: % of stockpile cap. used. 
Substitution: % of Substitution 
capacity used. 
Production Exp: % of Production Exp 
capacity used. 
 
The first two variables are simply for display / record keeping, and not directly 
incorporated into any formulae. See screenshot below for how they can be input into the 
optimization engine. 
The last five variables are the model’s decision variables. They can be set 
manually to any number between zero and 1.0 to do “what-if” analysis with the 
simulation. 
The last three “primary options” are likely to have significant fixed (non-
recurring) costs, so the optimization engine will tend to recommend a second one of these 




Risk 0.05  
Budget 500,000$           
Percent-Alternative-Implemented
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